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INTRODUCTION
The traditional field of conflict of laws involved private laws and
private actors.' Thus, issues would arise when a vehicular accident took
place in Ontario, involving Canadian victims and a New York State driver,
when the forum judge had to decide which country's law should be applied
to the situation. 2 Solutions varied across the globe. Most of Europe adopted
a strict bilateral approach, called the Savigny-method, where each category
of legal situations was governed by a specific choice-of-law rule.3 In the
1960s, the United States "rebelled" when many states adopted the interest
analysis approach. Developed by the great Currie, this approach advocated
flexibility by adopting substance-oriented choice-of-law rules.4 During the
post-Currie era, scholars advocated a variety of approaches to the choice-of-
law problem.5 The debate focused on the need to reconcile overlapping and
possibly conflicting private law rules.
In the area of public laws and regulations, conflict-of-law rules had no
place whatsoever. The term "public law taboo" was developed to describe
the state of affairs where it was unthinkable for the forum judge to even
consider foreign public law.6 Instead, if the traditional conflict-of-law rules
led the forum judge toward the inevitable application of foreign public laws,
the case would simply be dismissed.7 Moreover, courts resolved the issue of
when to apply American public laws to conduct occurring abroad by
The discipline of conflict of laws is also sometimes referred to as private international
law. Thus, these two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
2 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 *N.Y. 1963).
3 F. VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS (1849).
4 CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS (1963). For a general description of the American choice-
of-law revolution, see Gerhard Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 Recueil des Cours
91 (1964).
' See e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 295-30 (1966).
6 See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in International
Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 255-256, n. 2 (1999) [hereinafter McConnaughay]
(describing that the phrase "public law taboo" seems to have originated with Professor A.
Lowenfeld). See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict
of Laws, International Law and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 Recueil des
Cours 311, 322 (1979) [hereinafter Lowenfeld]).
' See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance,
42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 935-936 (2002) [hereinafter Buxbaum]; Donald T. Trautman, The Role
of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Litigation,
22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 617 (1961); see also McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 262 (tracing this
principle to the ancient refusal of states to enforce penal or revenue laws of other states).
[Vol. 13:2
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developing so-called prescriptive jurisdiction rules. These rules dictated
when the application of domestic regulations extraterritorially was
warranted. 8
In recent decades, the conflict-of-laws paradigm changed to encompass
conflicts of public laws. As international commerce intensified, economic
operators became frecIuently exposed to the mandatory laws and regulations
of multiple countries. This situation gave rise to regulatory clashes. I will
refer to these as clashes of the titans because the new conflicts involve
mandatory regulations developed by state authorities in order to govern
certain types of conduct at all times without regard for the internationality of
given economic operators.' 0 Each state regulation of this type is a titan in
itself, and clashes of such regulations can often lead to diplomatically
embarrassing scenarios for the states involved and economically catastrophic
consequences for the operators.
The traditional field of conflict of laws proved inept at resolving the
new regulatory puzzles because of the public law taboo and because of its
inherent nature of regulating conflicts of private laws." Moreover,
American prescriptive jurisdiction rules, designed to determine when
American public laws could be applied extraterritorially, answered only half
of the inquiry. Courts were concerned with the problem of applying
domestic law to an international situation. They did not look to assess
whether foreign public laws would be better suited to govern the given
situation.12 European courts followed a similar approach to their American
counterpart. 13 The overall situation quickly became troublesome. Economic
8 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 935-936. Note that traditional conflict of laws issues are
resolved by reference to the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws (American
Law Institute 197 1) [hereinafter Conflict of Laws Restatement], whereas the type of conflict
raised by questions of extraterritoriality is considered in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United State (American Law Institute 1987) [hereinafter Foreign
Relations Restatement], which classifies the categories of jurisdiction as jurisdiction to
prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce. Foreign Relations
Restatement at 401.
9 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 933.
'0 Id. at 934-936.
" Whether it is appropriate to use a method developed in the area of private law to
address questions of the scope of public regulatory law is an issue that has sparked vigorous
debate. See e.g. Lowenfeld, supra note 6; see generally Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Jurgen Basedow, Conflicts of Economic Regulations, 42 AM. J.
COMP. L. 423 (1994).
12 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 935-936 (explaining that a court simply determines whether
a particular U.S. regulation applies to a transaction, but that the court does not choose between
forum regulatory law and foreign regulatory law).
13 For example, in the antitrust arena, Europeans adopted a test very similar to the
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operators remained exposed to several countries' mandatory public
regulations. Each country had its own prescriptive jurisdiction rules which
could vary greatly from continent to continent and region to region. No
universal rules addressed the situation.
There is a need to address the problem and to tame the clashing titans.
The state of affairs as described above remains almost the same today.
Regulatory clashes occur frequently and there have been few attempts to
harmonize different prescriptive jurisdiction rules. When important
industries are involved, certain clashes raise serious diplomatic concerns.1
4
Other clashes, although less diplomatically sensitive, nonetheless lead to
regulatory nightmares for the economic operators involved.
Part I of this article describes regulatory clashes involving different
states' public laws, and then focuses on certain areas of law, including
antitrust, securities, and Internet commerce and publishing, where such
clashes are most likely to take place. Part II focuses on the different
solutions to this regulatory puzzle invoked by scholars, advocating either
territorial-based or substance-based approaches. Part III then critiques the
two approaches, while emphasizing the need to address the issue from a
global perspective, that is, by seeking to harmonize jurisdiction-allocating
rules on an international level.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONS
In today's globalized world, economic operators no longer function
within one national system. Rather, their commercial activity tends to span
across regions, countries, and continents. As their global entrepreneurship
grows, so does their exposition to different countries' mandatory
regulations.' 5 When different countries' regulations start overlapping, the
operator often finds itself exposed to multiple conflicting laws. This can lead
to both over-regulation' 6 and under-regulation if there are no laws at all and
American "effects" jurisdiction. See Joined Cases 89 & 85, Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193,
5233, 5246 (1988).
14 See, e.g., the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas or GE/Honeywell transactions. Buxbaum,
supra note 7, at 940, n. 40.
" Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 940 ("Issuers engage in securities offerings outside their
home jurisdiction corporations with substantial activities in multiple countries merge with
others; multinational corporations with assets, debtors and creditors in multiple countries file
for bankruptcy - in each such case, more than one state may assert prescriptive jurisdiction on
the basis of conduct within its territory").
16 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 940 (noting that the an increase in cross-border business
activity created an increase in the incidence of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction); Horatia
Muir-Watt, Special Feature: Cyberage Conflicts Law: Yahoo! Cyber-Collision of Cultures:
Who Regulates? 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673, 677 (2003) [hereinafter Muir-Watt] (noting the
potential for over-regulation in the area of cyber conflicts of law).
[Vol. 13:2
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countries refuses to regulate the commercial activity at stake.' 7 Areas in
which such over- and under-regulation occur include, inter alia, antitrust
law, securities regulations, and Internet publishing and commerce.
A. Regulatory Clashes Lead to Over- or Under-Regulation
An operator based in Ohio and engaged in cross-border commerce
cannot expect that purely local Ohio statutes will govern its activity. Rather,
the operator should reasonably foresee its worldwide susceptibility to laws
of all those countries where it has commercial dealings. Invariably, different
countries have different laws and these countries have different rules for
determining when these laws apply to specific types of conduct. Such rules,
which determine the precise reach of a country's laws, are typically referred
to as prescriptive jurisdiction rules.18
In an ideal world, all countries would have substantially similar
prescriptive jurisdiction rules and an economic operator could easily
determine which countries would and could impose their rules on it. Alas,
prescriptive jurisdiction rules vary from country to country and often subject
the same operator to so-called "true conflict" situations.1 9 When laws of
country A dictate a certain result which laws of country B negate, it places
the operator in an impossible scenario. The operator cannot comply with
both countries' laws, but risks sanctions or liability for lack of compliance in
the country whose rules it chooses not to obey. Such instances of over-
regulation are problematic to say the least. Conversely, when country A's
laws point to country B, and country B's laws point to country A the result is
under-regulation or an operator who is free from regulation.
In a scenario involving multiple countries, the operator's compliance
calculus becomes impossible to perform in an accurate manner. Once the
operator makes compliance mistakes and wrongly assumes that it need not
obey a specific country's regulations, it exposes itself to costly legal
sanctions. This may hinder international commerce by placing externalities
17 See McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 285-87 (discussing problems of under-regulation
in the area of public laws conflicts).
IS See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 8, at 401. Note that the terms legislative
and prescriptive jurisdiction tend to be used synonymously by scholars, and I shall refer to
these two terms interchangeably.
1" See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), where the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the situation at issue was not one of "true conflict" because the
U.S. regulation at question was restrictive, whereas the competing British law was merely
permissive; the operator could thus comply with both laws simultaneously. The terminology
"true conflict" and "false conflict" was first used by Currie in the context of traditional choice-
of-law analysis. See Currie, supra note 4.
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on international commercial activities. Such externalities are unpleasant
for the operator and burdensome on the development of international
commerce.
B. Specific Regulatory Areas Exposed to Clashes of Public Laws
In the United States, prescriptive jurisdiction rules work differently in
different legal subfields. Regulatory areas that have been most exposed to
over- or under-regulation because of clashes between American laws and
other countries' laws include antitrust, securities regulations, and Internet
publishing and commerce.
1. Antitrust
The antitrust area experienced regulatory clashes at the beginning of the
20 th century, causing the Supreme Court to adopt a purely territorial
approach: United States' antitrust laws applied only to conduct occurring
within American territory. 22  This approach led to significant under-
regulation. For example, economic operators removed themselves from the
reach of the Sherman Act simply by crossing the Rio Grande and by
engaging in illegal activities in Mexico. Moreover, it quickly became
apparent that the purely territorial rule no longer corresponded to the
realities of international commerce. Thus, following World War II,
American judges modified the territorial approach to hold that any conduct
that was intended to produce effects within the United States and did, in fact,
produce such effects could be subjected to the Sherman Act.23  With
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, American judges solved
some under-regulation issues by making evasion of antitrust laws difficult.
21 Scholars have already noted that a proportional allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction
among nations could help achieve the facilitation of international commerce, by increasing the
likelihood of developing predictability in the system. See, e.g., Harold G. Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a CrossRoads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 318 (1982); Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy
Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 503
(1989); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 998 (1994).
2 See McCormaughay, supra note 6, at 275-276 (describing scholarship that focused on
the need to facilitate international commerce by developing a system that would allocate
legislative authority among the international community in order to avoid overburdening
operators).
22 See generally, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
23 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). This case
gave rise to the infamous "effects" doctrine that is used to determine the extra-territorial
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.
[Vol. 13:2
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The extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws immediately
caused an over-regulation problem each time the country where the alleged
illegal activity took place also sought to regulate conduct based on a purely
territorial theory of prescriptive jurisdiction.2 4 American courts attempted to
temper the over-regulation problem by resorting to interest-balancing
methods and by including a "reasonableness" inquiry into the question of
when American antitrust laws should be applied extraterritorially. 25 During
the 1990s, the Supreme Court, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
seemingly rejected such interest-balancing when it resorted to a more
territorial-based approach 26 in order to revive the former method in F.
Hoffman LaRoche v. Empagran.27
The Empagran case involved a lawsuit brought by a foreign purchaser
against a vitamin-pricing cartel in an American court.2  The lawsuit alleged
illegal conduct, all of which took place in foreign countries.29  Plaintiff
alleged that such a worldwide conspiracy produced significant effects in the
U.S. market, but the suit was brought based on harm in foreign markets.
30
The Supreme Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, holding
that whenever possible, domestic statutes should be construed to avoid
interference with foreign sovereign authority. 31  Moreover, the Supreme
Court reviewed several briefs filed by a number of foreign governments,
each asserting its own authority to regulate the conduct in question without
interference from the United States, and expressed its desire to "help the
potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in
24 See Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 934, n. 7 (describing diplomatic friction caused by over-
application of certain countries' regulations, leading to blocking statutes).
25 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976). The "reasonableness" inquiry, entailed in the interest-balancing approach, was also
adopted by the Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 8, at 403. For a discussion of
reasonableness, see Milena Sterio, The Globalization Era and the Conflict of Laws: What
Europe Could Learn from the United States and Vice Versa, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
161, 180, n.72 (2005).
16 See generally, Hartford Fire Ins. Co., v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). According to
some authors, Hartford Fire, by rejecting interest-balancing, revived the public law taboo. See
McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 291 ("But Hartford Fire clearly reads like a specific
application of the public law taboo insofar as it suggests very plainly that notions of 'comity'
and comparative interest balancing are not permissible constraints on the jurisdictional reach
of the Sherman Act....").
27 See generally, F. Hoffman LaRoche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
28 Id.
29 Id. See also, Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 257-258.
0 F. Hoffman LaRoche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155. See also, DUNOFF, RATNER,
WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, Aspen Publishers, 2d ed. 2006,
at 372 [hereinafter DUNOFF, RATNER, WIPPMAN].
31 F. Hoffman LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164.
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 13 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 101 2006-2007
University of California, Davis
harmony."
32
2. Securities Regulation
In the securities regulation area, clashes of different countries'
mandatory regulations occur frequently as issuers become global and
register on several stock exchanges. American courts have attempted to
resolve the conflicts issue by applying two jurisdictional tests designed to
evaluate whether the conduct in question is sufficiently connected to the
United States to mandate the application of our laws. The first is the
"conduct" test, which calls for regulatory jurisdiction of the place where the
allegedly illegal conduct took place.33 Courts typically look for conduct that
is more than mere preparation for the fraud in order to assert U.S.
jurisdiction.3 4  The second is the "effects" test, which establishes such
jurisdiction in the place of the fraudulent conduct's effects.3 5 The effects
test, similar to the effects jurisdiction in the antitrust area, seeks to protect
domestic markets and investors from harm caused by foreign conduct.
3 6
Much like in the antitrust area, courts here seek to capture conduct which
harms U.S. markets, but which would escape the reach of American
securities regulations if such laws applied on a purely territorial model.
In cases involving the conduct test, courts have adopted two different
approaches. Some American courts have accepted their exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction in cases where the conduct taking place in the U.S.,
in the form of misrepresentations, materially advanced the frauds in
question, which took place abroad.37 Such cases, relying on the so-called
"fraud on the global market" theory, draw on the fact that misrepresentations
made in the U.S. will affect trading prices abroad and domestically.3a  They
call for a more liberal and generous extraterritorial application of American
securities regulations In other words, the conduct test is allegedly satisfied
32 F. Hoffinan-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164.
33 For a classic articulation of this test, see Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,
722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983); IIT v. Vencap, ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975);
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
3' Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 275
(2006) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation].
3' For a classic articulation of this test, see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206
(2d Cir. 1968); see also Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d
Cir. 1989).
36 Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 34, at 275-76.
37 See, e.g., In re Bayer AG Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 1546 WHP, 2004 WL 2190357, at 17
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Tri Star Farms Ltd. V. Marconi, PLC, 225 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572
(W.D. Pa. 2002).
38 Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 34, at 276.
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and U.S. jurisdiction exists as long as substantial activities occurred
domestically. 39 Other courts, however, have adopted a stricter view. They
require that domestic conduct lead directly to the losses suffered by the
40foreign investor. The plaintiffs must show specific reliance on
misstatements made within the U.S. 41 Arguments that allege misstatements
made domestically affect prices in interconnected worldwide markets
42become insufficient. Courts adopting the narrower view have expressed a
concern that if fraud on the market satisfied the conduct test, then U.S. law
would apply around the world, whenever fraudulent misrepresentations were
made involving jointly traded securities.4 3
In cases involving the effects test, plaintiffs claim that if the same
conduct that harmed foreign markets also harms American markets, the
effects felt in the United States should be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
over all claims, including those brought by foreign purchasers. 44 Most of the
time, courts reject these claims by separating the effects on U.S. markets
from those on foreign markets, treating the resulting harm to U.S. and
foreign investors as independent. 45 This approach is similar to the one most
recently adopted by the Supreme Court in the antitrust area. Federal courts
lack jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs' claims that are based on the foreign
effects of the defendant's conduct and independent from any domestic effect
caused by the defendant's conduct.
46
" See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring only that "some
activity designated to further a fraudulent scheme" must occur within the United States).
40 McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 2d 920, 923-25 (E.D. Tex 1999) ("In
order to satisfy the conduct test, the Canadian Plaintiffs must demonstrate that domestic
conduct directly caused the alleged fraud.. Even if [misrepresentations made in the U.S.] were
indeed a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme, the Canadian Plaintiffs still have failed to
show how their losses were directly caused by these activities."). See also In re Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F. 3d 659,
665-66 (7th Cir. 1998).
"' Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 34, at 276.
42 In re Bayer, 2004 WL 2190357, at 18 (citing In re Baan, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 10). But
see In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 362 (D. Md. 2004),
where the court noted that SEC filings are the type of "devices" that a reasonable investor
would rely on in purchasing securities of the filing corporation. However, in In re Royal
Ahold, a U.S.-based accounting fraud was a material part of the alleged fraud. Id. at 362.
41 Tri Star Farms, 225. F. Supp. 2d at 579. But see Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory
Litigation, supra note 34, at 282, which argues that this concern is less relevant when the
norms to be applies are shared by other jurisdictions.
4 Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 34, at 277.
4 McNamara, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 924; see also Kaufman v. Campeau Corp., 744 F. Supp.
808, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that, although the defendants' action in Canada may have
affected U.S. investors, that effect was separate from the effect on foreign purchasers and
therefore not sufficient to meet that jurisdictional test).
46 See generally, F. Hoffman LaRoche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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3. Internet Publishing and Commerce
The area of Internet publishing and commerce can lead to clashes of
public laws designed to regulate free speech. Such clashes typically occur
when the publisher posts information in his country of origin that is not
offensive under the free speech regulations of that country. The same
information becomes globally available and offends free speech regulations
in other countries where Internet users have access to it.47 Which regulation
should trump the other? Does the country where information is accessed
have the right to restrict it although such information was perfectly legal
where it was posted? The free availability of information collides with the
right of the receiving state to protect itself against outside interference
creating a regulatory conflict.4
An Australian court recently held that Australian defamation laws
should apply in the case of an article published by Dow Jones in the United
States, but accessed by readers in Australia.49 In this case, plaintiff resided
in Australia and claimed that the American-published online article defamed
him.50  He claimed that because the article was publicly available in
Australia through the Internet, Australian defamation laws should apply.
51
Dow Jones claimed that under American defamation laws the plaintiff's
claim had no merit, and that only American laws should apply because the
publisher maintained its web servers in the United States. 5  Moreover,
according to Dow Jones, subjecting Internet publishers to worldwide
defamation laws would have a "chilling effect" on them. 53 Thus, Internet
publishers should only be subjected to defamation laws of the place where
their web servers are maintained.54 The Australian High Court disagreed
and held that because the publisher had voluntarily made the information
accessible worldwide, it could expect to be subjected to regulations around
the world, and especially in places where its conduct causes harmful
effects.55
" See Muir-Watt, supra note 15, at 674.
48 Id. at 676-677 ("If the receiving State can prohibit the emission of information, this
comes close to interference in the regulation of activities covered by constitutional immunity
in the State where the website is located; conversely, not to do so looks very much like
allowing cultural expansionism.")
'9 See generally, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.).
50 Id. at para. 2
s' Id. at para. 6.
52 Id. at para. 18.
3 Id. at para. 20.
I d. at para. 18.
" Justice Callinan wrote that publication occurs at the place where the matter is first
provided or first published, for the purposes of defamation laws. Id. Moreover, he wrote that
(Vol. 13:2
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In another case that drew global interest, a French court restricted
access in France to a Yahoo! auction website selling Nazi and Third Reich-
related goods, although the website was perfectly legal under American free
speech regulations. 56 Many scholars in the United States objected to such
action because the website was located in the United States. According to
these scholars, France, the receiving state, was attempting to curtail
fundamental freedom of expression by extraterritorially meddling with
American democratic values.F7 On the other hand, judges and scholars in
France saw the issue differently.58 Why should France have to accept U.S.
First Amendment protections? Why should activities conducted within
France be allowed, in violation of French constitutional and criminal law, in
an attempt to create an American cultural hegemony? 59 In other words, why
should American First Amendment protections apply extraterritorially?
Defendants in the Yahoo! case succeeded in obtaining an injunction in the
United States District Court that barred the French order from applying
domestically. 60 However, the Ninth Circuit, in a divided panel, ultimately
dismissed the case, thus refusing to confirm such an injunction.61 While
some judges disagreed with the outcome, emphasizing that France was
seeking to restrict First Amendment free speech protections
the appellant, Dow Jones, was seeking to impose an American legal hegemony upon
Australian residents, which "would be to confer upon one country, and one notably more
benevolent to the commercial and other media than this one, an effective domain over the law
of defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, and the serious
disadvantage of those unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the United
States." Id. For a Canadian case that specifically distinguished Gutnick, see Bangoura v.
Washington Post, 2005 CarswellOnt 4343 (Ont. C.A.) (defamation action by a former U.N
employee against a U.S.-based newspaper that published an article on its website stating that
plaintiffs co-workers had accused him of sexual harassment, financial improprieties and
nepotism; the court distinguished Gutnick because in that case plaintiff lived in Victoria and
was a well-known businessman, whereas plaintiff in this case did not live in Ontario.
Moreover, Dow Jones had 1,700 Internet subscribers in Australia, whereas only seven
subscribers existed to the defendant paper in Ontario). Id.
56 Tribunal de Grande Instance [T.G.I] [ordinary court oforiginal jurisdiction] Paris, Nov.
20, 2000, LICRA v. Yahoo!, No. RG 00/05308 (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Nov.
.20, 2000).
17 Muir-Watt, supra note 16, at 677.
58 Id.
59 Id.
o In Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(N.D. Cal. 2001), the district court held that "the First Amendment precluded enforcement
within the United States of a French order intended to regulate the content of its speech over
the Internet."
61 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F. 3d 1199 (9th
Cir. 2006)
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extraterritorially, 62 the majority seemed to think that an American injunction
would do the o posite, by extending domestic free speech protections to
French territory.
Such Internet cases exemplify the expanding category of international
conflicts with a public dimension, similar to the cases described above in the
antitrust and securities regulatory areas. The regulatory puzzle involving
issues of extraterritorial application of different countries' public laws is
difficult to resolve; not surprisingly, it has drawn significant scholarly
interest.
II. DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS TO THE REGULATORY PUZZLE
Scholars have attempted to address the issue of such regulatory clashes
in a variety of ways. Most recognize, however, that solutions must either
focus on territoriality or substance.64 To determine when U.S. laws should
apply extraterritorially, courts that have a territorial focus seek to find a
territorial or Rproximity link to the U.S. which would justify the application
of U.S. laws. Courts that adopt a more substantive focus seek to apply the
most appropriate law in light of the circumstances of each case.66
A. Solutions Focusing on Territoriality
Several scholars recently advocated the need to temper substance-based
67analysis of regulatory conflict with a more territorial approach. In a 1993
62 "The issue is not.., one of extra-territorial application of the First Amendment; if
anything, it is the extra-territorial application of French law to the United States... We should
not allow a foreign court order to be used as leverage to quash constitutionally protected
speech by denying the United States-based target an adjudication of its constitutional rights in
federal court." DUNOFF, RATNER, WIPPMAN, supra note 30, at 386.
63 Three of the judges wrote that the French orders required only that Yahoo! restrict
access by Internet users located in France, and that such orders said nothing about restricting
access by Internet users in the United States. Thus, Yahoo! was arguing that it had a First
Amendment right to violate French criminal law and to facilitate the violation of French
criminal law by others, a solution which the majority of the Ninth Circuit seemed to disagree
with. DUNOFF, RATNER, WIPPMAN, supra note 30, at 386.
6 See, e.g. Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 933-934.
65 Id. (noting that in a traditional model of conflicts analysis based on territoriality, a state
concerned in a conflict of economic laws will seek to protect its own regulatory interests by
applying its law to the dispute).
' Id. at 957 ("the term substantivism, by contrast, is used to describe a choice-of-law
methodology whose goal is to select the better law in any given case"); id. at 933-934 (noting
that under a substantivist view, important economic policy interests "may be protected simply
through assurance that the substance of applicable law... is sufficiently similar to that of the
concerned state").
67 See generally Buxbaum, supra note 7; McConnaughay, supra note 6.
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landmark decision that revived the so-called public law taboo, the Supreme
Court endorsed the territorial analysis in the antitrust arena.68 Historically,
courts have not been willing to apply foreign public law. If a conflict of law
rule pointed to the applicability of another nation's public law, U.S. court
would dismiss the case, hence the "taboo." 69 Public laws were simply not a
matter of adjudication for American courts. 70 Recently, however, the taboo
has been challenged by several developments in the area of private
international law. As described above, increased globalization of commerce
and inter-state commercial transactions have contributed to the rise of
regulatory clashes. 71 The role of private non-state actors has significantly
expanded in this arena.72  Courts have been willing to endorse party
autonomy in regulatory areas where traditionally it was impossible to
displace American laws in favor of foreign ones.73 The concept of applying
foreign public laws by American courts is no longer as taboo as it was in the
past. According to some scholars, this is not necessarily a good thing.
74
Phillip J. McConnaughay advocates the need to resurrect the "public
law taboo." 75 According to McConnaughay, the conflicts field is ill suited to
resolve clashes of public regulations because it leads to under-regulation and
76
a lack of predictability. In addition, courts and private parties are not
equipped to undertake the complex burdens of attempting to identify and
balance the interests of multiple countries involved.77 Instead of engaging in
6' Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (the Supreme Court here
seemingly rejected interest-balancing in order to focus simply on the territorial reach of the
Sherman Act, thereby rejecting substantive concerns of reasonableness and comity and
adopting a purely territorial approach. Note however, that the Court left open the possibility of
interest-balancing in case of a true conflict - a situation where both American law and foreign
law imposed certain behavior on the economic operator); see McConnaughay, supra note 6, at
257-258 ("Hartford Fire arguably signals a restoration of the traditional principle that neither
conflicts analysis ... nor principles of contractual autonomy apply to public law..."); see also
id. at 291-292 (discussing the revival of the public law taboo by Hartford Fire).
69 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 935-36; McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 262.
70 McCormaughay, supra note 6, at 256.
71 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 933 (noting that the globalization of economic markets and
attendant changes in cross-border regulatory strategies challenge the foundational principles of
private international law).
72 See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 945 (noting the role of private actors in the
regulation of international economic activity).
73 Consider for example the rise in arbitration, through which the dispute resolution
mechanism in cross-border transactions has been privatized. Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 945.
" See generally McConnaughay, supra note 6.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 284-285. According to this author, the risk of
diminished regulation or under-regulation "is great whenever private contractual election nor
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substantive analysis or interest-balancing as some courts have done, 78 and as
the Third Restatement suggests, 79 McConnaughay asserts that we would be
better off if courts simply refused to apply certain foreign public law
altogether.80  American courts could abide by territorial rules, seeking to
determine when American laws should apply extraterritorially. If the judge
determines that the extraterritorial application of our laws is not warranted
because a foreign public law is applicable, the judge should simply dispose
of the case.81 Thus, territoriality concerns should trump substantive analysis
in the area of regulatory clashes, where any type of interest-balancing is ill-
suited.82
Similarly, Hannah L. Buxbaum advocates the need to temper substance-
based conflicts analysis in the area of regulatory clashes with a territorial
approach.83 According to Buxbaum, purely substantive approaches lead to
over-application of American laws and to process-related unfairness in the
resolution of economic conflicts. 
84
For example, Buxbaum analyzes the infamous Lloyd's litigation to
conclude that American courts chose to displace domestic securities
regulations only because the British law chosen by the parties was so similar
to American laws.85  If the chosen law had been different, the courts
comparative interest balancing analysis displaces forum public law." Moreover, the merger of
conflicts principles and public law "substantially reduces predictability in international
transactions rather than increasing it." Finally, the process of balancing multiple states'
interests "in order to achieve a fair and equitable allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction"
belongs in the political arena, and courts and private parties should not be engaging in it Id.
78 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F. 2d at 597
(9th Cir. 1976).
'9 Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 8, at 403(2).
80 McConnaughay advocates a distinction between mandatory public laws, that should fall
within the public law taboo, and nonmandatory public laws, which should or should not fall
within the public law taboo depending on the reason for their failure to qualify as mandatory.
McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 311-312.
81 Note, however, that McConnaughay only advocates this solution for mandatory public
laws. Id. For certain non-mandatory public laws and for private laws, the public law taboo
should not be applied at all and traditional conflicts rules can still provide adequate solutions.
Id.
82 McCaunnaghay advocates the idea that his classification system, consisting of
mandatory public laws, non-mandatory public laws, and private laws, will "reserve for the
political arena, instead of an ill-equipped judiciary, any accommodation of public laws that is
necessary because of overlapping regulatory interests of several nations." McConnaughay,
supra note 6, at 312.
8 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 967-976 (discussing the costs of substantivist approaches in
the area of conflicts of economic laws).
'4 Id. at 966.
85 Id. at 967 (noting that the U.S. courts deciding to honor forum-selection and choice-of-
law clauses at issue in favor of British securities law never considered whether U.S. law
[Vol. 13:2
HeinOnline  -- 13 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 108 2006-2007
Clash of the Titans
probably would not have enforced the forum selection and choice-of-law
clauses, despite the fact that a territorial analysis might have dictated the
applicability of such dissimilar foreign law.86 Moreover, if the court
ultimately concluded that U.S. securities laws did not reach the
extraterritorial conduct in question, it would simply dismiss the case.87 This
method is problematic for two reasons. First, a purely substantive analysis
of choice of law and forum clauses is inconsistent with the traditional
approaches to such clauses, which call for an initial consideration of
territorial contacts. This consideration should provide "the context in which
the competing policies are considered. 88 Second, courts that have rejected
choice of law and forum clauses on substantive grounds may feel justified in
applying U.S. law even in cases where such application is weak. 9 Once a
court declines to enforce choice of law and forum clauses, it must inquire
whether U.S. law reaches the conduct in question. If it does not, the court
must dismiss the case. 90 As courts may be reluctant to do so, they may also
seek to justify weak cases of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. 91
Allowing substantive analysis to always trump territoriality can lead toward
the imposition of an American cultural hegemony in important regulatory
areas.
Moreover, according to Buxbaum, a system of private international law
based on sovereignty turns each situation of conflict of laws into a conflict
between sovereigns. The question becomes which sovereign will manage to
exert its regulatory power.92  As some states are "more sovereign than
others," 93 it becomes more likely that the policies embedded in the laws and
regulations of a relatively small number of powerful states will be
implemented.94 The power of sovereign states plays a role in determining
the outcome of such regulatory conflicts. 95  Such a process "replaces
'neutral' consideration of competing laws with the application of law
applied to the relevant transactions at all, but simply considered whether the policies embodies
in U.S. securities laws would be violated by application of chosen foreign law). For an
analysis of the Lloyd's litigation, see infra Part lI.B.
86 Id. at 968.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 968-69.
89 Id. at 969.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 973.
9' Id. at 974, citing Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: Any
Implicationsfor International Law? 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109, 116 (2000).
94 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 974.
95 Id.
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reflecting non-neutral values." 96 According to Buxbaum, the substantivist
system poses a danger because international regulatory standards invariably
show a bias toward the approach of certain powerful states. This bias will be
reflected in each instance of their application, irrelevant of whether the
transaction subject to regulation bore any territorial connections with those
states at all.97 The solution may be to temper substance-based approaches to
clashes of public laws with the more or less traditional territorial approach.
B. Solutions Focusing on Substantivism
Some scholars argue that it would be preferable for courts to analyze
regulatory conflicts situations in a substance-oriented manner. Instead of
applying a purely territorial analysis, courts should analyze the substance of
potentially applicable laws, domestic and foreign, in order to assess which
law provides the best solution to the given issue.98 The Third Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law adopts the substance-oriented inquiry in a limited
manner, by including a reasonableness inquiry in its list of factors that a
court is to consider when deciding whether to apply American law
extraterritorially.
99
96 Id.
97 Id. at 975.
9' See generally Leflar, supra note 5, for a discussion of this approach in the domestic
context; see Kegel, supra note 4, at 184-85, for a discussion of the distinction between
conflicts justice and substantive justice. Moreover, Professor von Mehren identified three
situations in which the development of substantive rules would be desirable:
In the first type of situation, the forum considers that two legal orders are
sufficiently concerned with a given situation that the rules of both should be
given effect, but the domestic rules do not lend themselves to cumulative
application.. .The second general class comprises situations which, because of
their multi-state characteristics, involve considerations which do not have
particular significance in comparable domestic settings... A third class of
situations is presented only by cases of true conflict, that is to say, situations in
which two or more legal orders have legitimate reasons to regulate the dispute
that has arisen, but hold mutually inconsistent views respecting the form such
regulation should take.
Arthur T. von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate-State Problems: Their Role
and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REv. 347, 358-
59 (1974).
9 See Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 8, at 403(b)(2)(c) ("The importance of
regulation to the regulating state.. and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted."); id. at 403(2)(f) ("the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system"); id. at 403(2)(h) ("the likelihood of conflict with
regulation by another state"). Note, however, that the reasonableness inquiry also includes
some territorial-based factors. See, e.g., id. at 403(2)(a) ("The link of the activity to the
territory of the regulating state."); id. at 403(2)(b) ("the connections, such as nationality,
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Some courts have shown the desire to engage in this type of analysis.
Recently, several courts of appeal enforced choice-of-law and forum-
selection clauses in the infamous Lloyd's litigation. The courts ruled in
favor of British law contained in investment agreements signed by American
investors, thereby explicitly accepting the displacement of U.S. securities
regulations. 00 The U.S. courts analyzed the issue and the laws at stake
concluding that because the U.K. laws were substantially similar to
American securities regulations, it was appropriate to enforce forum-
selection and choice of law clauses in the disputed investment contracts that
allowed defendants to escape the reach of American securities laws.
101
These decisions clearly displaced U.S. securities laws and refused to view
territorial sovereignty as determinative.' 0 2 Courts in these cases focused on
the question of applicable economic law in light of whether the law chosen
by the parties is reasonable considering the existing domestic policies.
10 3
The application of U.K securities laws was acceptable here precisely
because of the substance of those laws. In fact, some of the Lloyd's
decisions engaged in a detailed comparison of U.K. securities laws with
those of the U.S., leading those courts to conclude that economic policies
underlying U.S. securities laws would be protected even upon application of
U.K. laws. 1
04
In the antitrust area, the Supreme Court restored a substance-oriented
approach in determining the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act. After
reviving the "public law taboo" by adopting a territorial-based approach in
the last decade,'0 5 the Supreme Court reintroduced interest-balancing in the
same jurisdiction-allocating analysis involving the reach of the Sherman Act
over extraterritorial conduct, in a situation where other countries may also
have a strong interest to regulate such conduct. 1° 6  In the antitrust field,
residence, of economic activity, between the regulatory state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated").
"o See generally, Riley v. Kingsey Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.
1992); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F. 2dd 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's,
3 F. 3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F. 3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Allen v.
Lloyd's of London, 94 F. 3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F. 3d
956 (5th Cir. 1997); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F. 3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); Lipcon v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F. 3d 1285 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
'01 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 960-61.
102 Id. at 960.
103 Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 960.
104 Id. at 960-61.
"' See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. at 764 (1993); see supra Part
I.B.I.
"o See F. Hoffman La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 155 (2004). But see Buxbaum,
Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 34, at 274-275, which argues that the
Empagran case did not entirely overturn the territorial approach of Hartford Fire, because the
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substantivism seems to have reasserted itself in judicial analysis of
prescriptive jurisdiction.
Some scholars advocate the need to emphasize substantivism over
territorialism in solving the regulatory puzzle in specific legal subfields. For
instance, in the bankruptcy arena, authors suggest that debtors have the
option of choosing which country's bankruptcy laws should apply to their
given situation. 1°7 Debtors are able to analyze the substance of various laws
in order to choose the most beneficial to their particular circumstances.
Similarly, in the securities regulatory field, scholars suggest a system under
which companies could freely select the securities regime of any country to
govern their securities transactions. 10 8 In the traditional regulatory conflicts
arena, Andrew Guzman advocates the need to choose the most economically
efficient law to regulate a given situation. 10 9 The quest for the optimal law
works toward the furtherance of global wealth. The system would require
courts to forego any territoriality-based analysis for a substance-oriented
comparison of global laws in order to pick the one with the fewest
externalities.'1 0 State-focused territorial interests would be replaced by the
search for optimal global interests. This would benefit all countries, not just
the forum state.111 Under this approach, substance would clearly trump
D.C. Circuit re-examining the case after remand from the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs
had only managed to establish an indirect link between the U.S. prices and the harm they
suffered in overseas transactions, so that the territorial link to the U.S. remained insufficient to
support American jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. "This decision therefore maintains an
allocation of regulatory authority according to territorial boundaries even over what is
apparently conceded to be a global market." Id. at 275.
107 Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH J.
INT'L L. 1 (1997). Courts have also considered the substance of foreign law in cases of
conflict between U.S. and foreign bankruptcy law; see e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Bus.
Sys., Inc., 830 F. 2d 1260 (3rd Cir. 1987). See also Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
304(c)(4)(2000) (setting forth a list of relevant factors to assist courts in making the decision
whether assets of the insolvent located within the U.S. should be distributed to U.S. creditors
under American distribution rules, or should be remitted for distribution in an ongoing foreign
proceeding under foreign law; one of these factors is whether distribution of assets under the
foreign bankruptcy regime would take place "substantially in accordance" with the order in
which assets would be distributed under U.S. law).
108 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903 (1998). For other private
choice arguments in the securities field, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); Alan R. Palmiter,
Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (1999).
109 Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, School of Law, Boalt Hall, U.C.
Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 28 (2000), available at
http://www.ssrn.com (last visited on Dec. 9, 2006).
110 Id.
"' Guzman refers to the "global optimum," which he defines as "the set of substantive
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territorial sovereignty.
Both the territoriality and substantivism approaches, however, suffer
from one-sidedness. They only focus on what domestic courts should do. To
truly address the problem and seek a truly international solution to
regulatory clashes, a more global perspective should be adopted.
III. THE NEED TO HARMONIZE PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION RULES
The above-described territorial and substantive approaches to the
resolution of regulatory conflicts analyze the issue from a domestic
perspective: how should American courts and judges reason when
confronted with a difficult clash of several public laws, including our own?
However, none of the above approaches focus on a more universal inquiry.
Can we harmonize rules so that judges sitting in different jurisdictions can
resort to similar solutions, thereby increasing predictability of outcomes and
reducing externalities for economic operators?
A. Why Harmonization is Needed Within Specific Fields
The need for such harmonization of jurisdiction-allocating rules is
greater in certain areas. As described above, certain fields, such as antitrust,
securities, and Internet commerce and publishing, have been more exposed
to troublesome regulatory clashes." 3 In some instances, the outcomes have
been painful for the operators and diplomatically challenging for the
countries involved. 14 The need to harmonize prescriptive jurisdiction rules
seems the most acute in the above three areas.
policies that would exist if a single benevolent and well-informed global policy maker were
able to establish laws". Id. at 19.
... Scholars have already noted the problem of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction caused
by different jurisdiction allocating rules. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 940-941:
Moreover, as U.S. courts and courts in other jurisdictions began to apply
regulatory law to extraterritorial conduct, additional regulatory overlaps were
created as countries obtained jurisdiction based on different jurisdictional tests.
One state's law might apply to conduct because it occurred within its borders,
for instance, while another's might apply because of effect caused within its
borders by that conduct.
113 See supra, Part I.B.
114 See, e.g., the Franco-American rift caused by the Yahoo! affair. Supra Part I.B.3. See
also the Laker Airways antitrust litigation, representing a notorious example of cross-border
judicial warfare, where U.K. and U.S. courts exchanged anti-suit and counter-anti-suit
injunctions to protect prescriptive jurisdiction. Laker Airways Ltd. V. Pan Am. World Airways,
235 U.S. App. D.C. 207 (1984). See also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 5 (1996) (analyzing this type of struggle
for jurisdiction).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 13 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 113 2006-2007
University of California, Davis
First, harmonization of prescriptive jurisdiction rules could lead to more
predictable outcomes across the globe.1 5  Economic operators and their
legal counsel would more easily be able to predict how judges would rule.
Operators could significantly reduce their externalities by adjusting conduct
so they only remain subject to a certain number of regulations, and not
potentially all of them.
Second, such harmonization could appease the problem of under- or
over-regulation. If most jurisdictions had substantially similar jurisdiction
allocating rules, a situation of under-regulation would not frequently occur.
For example, if all jurisdictions adopted an effects test in the antitrust area,
the operator would certainly be subject to regulation somewhere, because
invariably his conduct produces effects somewhere.116 A situation of under-
regulation would not be altogether avoided. To adopt the same hypothesis
as above, where most jurisdictions were to adopt the effects test in the
antitrust area, courts in countries A, B, and C could all conclude that effects
are felt within their territory and could all seek to impose their regulations.
However, the operator would be able to avoid such multiple exposures from
the outset, by adjusting conduct so that it doesn't produce effects in all those
jurisdictions, if only he knew that all the judges would reason the same way.
Third, the "public law taboo" would no longer be necessary. If most
jurisdictions adopted similar jurisdiction allocating rules, and if such
harmonized rules sometimes dictated the applicability of foreign law, a
judge from country A would no longer have to worry about applying country
B's public law because presumably country B's judge, if consulted, would
have also decided that his own law applied. Moreover, there would be no
comity concerns. Country B could decide to apply country A's laws in a
different situation if the harmonized jurisdiction allocating rules dictated that
..5 But see McConnaughay, supra note 6, at 289-290, who advocates that the demise of the
public law taboo has contributed to unpredictability of results, as opposed to enhancing their
predictability, which was the reason in the first place that many scholars had written against
the public law taboo. However, McConnaughay's concern is about the use of conflicts rules in
U.S. courts, such as interest-balancing, to allocate American prescriptive jurisdiction in the
area of public laws; he thinks that such use is inappropriate and that the taboo should be
revived. My argument, on the contrary, is about the need to harmonize prescriptive
jurisdiction rules among various countries in specific fields of law, so that, in essence, there
would be no need to perform the type of unpredictable post-facto interest-balancing analysis
that American courts engage in currently. The harmonization would occur on an international
level among political branches, so that courts would no longer be engaged in the process of
allocating jurisdictional domains, a process that, according to McConnaghay, is ill-suited for
the judiciary.
116 Of course, this presupposes a similar availability of damages in most jurisdictions that
could attract and encourage potential plaintiffs. Although damages may be higher in the
United States than, for example, in Europe, the availability of some forum that could attribute
even a lower amount of damages, is preferable to no forum at all.
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result.
Similarly, some concerns raised by the substance-oriented analysis
could be avoided. 17 Courts would no longer have to dismiss cases
whenever foreign public laws were applicable. There would be no threat of
imposing one country's legal and cultural hegemony because the
harmonization of jurisdiction allocating rules would invariably promote the
applicability of different laws in different situations, regardless of their
substance. 1 8
Finally, concerns raised by the purely territorial approach would be
thwarted. Scholars criticize the territorial approach for its one-sidedness.
When an American court engages in a territorial analysis, it only cares about
the proximity of a given situation to its own forum. The court does not care
about other countries' interest or about their own territorial claim to govern
the situation. If jurisdiction allocating rules were harmonized, judges would
be forced to rule from a more global perspective. Sometimes their forum
would prevail, but sometimes it would lose because of other countries'
stronger interests. We would be closer to the economic optimum advocated
by Andrew Guzman and closer to the global welfare which he suggests we
seek." 9
B. Inherent Challenges to Such Harmonization
Harmonization is easier said than done. How can we possibly get all
countries in the world to agree when their regulations should apply to certain
situations? Negotiations of multilateral conventions have always proved
difficult and have not necessarily led to the best result. Often the lowest
common denominator is chosen as a solution. Nonetheless, in the regulatory
conflicts area in specific legal fields, such harmonization could be at least
envisioned.
First, it would be easier to hold negotiations in some kind of an
institutional international forum. Guzman advocates this idea and suggests
bodies such as the World Trade Organization. 20 Other organizations such
"' For a discussion of concerns caused by substantivism, see supra Part II.A (discussing
scholarship by McConnaughay and Buxbaum, which cautions against the pure use of
substantivism in choice-of-law analysis involving clashes of public regulations).
... It is true, as Buxbaum suggests, supra Part II.A, that any such harmonization of
prescriptive jurisdiction rules would favor the "more sovereign" countries, as they would be
able to impose their models and solutions on the rest of the world. However, even such an
imperfect solution would be preferable to the current system, whereby the forum judge often
over-applies domestic laws, or dismisses the case altogether when the application of foreign
public laws is inevitable.
"9 Guzman, supra note 109, at 19-21.
120 Id. at 75.
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as the World Bank or UNCITRAL could be tenable alternatives.
Second, the European experience certainly shows that it is possible to
harmonize conflict of law rules within culturally similar countries.'
21
Harmonization could first be attempted within a set of culturally and legally
similar countries where domestic jurisdiction allocating rules would already
be similar.
Third, harmonization could be more easily achieved in certain areas
such as in the securities field, where some degree of such harmonization has
already occurred. For example, a Securities Convention negotiated at the
Hague Private Law Conference in July 2006 allocates which country's laws
will apply to securities used as collateral. 122  Operators coming from
member countries are exposed to only one country's regulations in this
field. 123 Some fields probably lend themselves better to harmonization. For
example, scholars advocate that cyberspace and Internet regulations lend
themselves better to the quest for optimal rules on prescriptive
jurisdiction.' 24
Fourth, international negotiating experiences show that procedural rules
are more easily agreed on than important substantive ones. For example, it
is easier for countries to negotiate a convention on the international service
of process, than it is to come to a multilateral agreement on adoption. To the
extent that jurisdiction allocating rules are perceived as procedural, it may be
easier to attempt a multilateral negotiation session in this domain, rather than
to try to change the underlying substantive antitrust, securities, or Internet
regulations. 1
25
Finally, economic realities in some fields, such as antitrust, have
already led different jurisdictions' judges to reach similar results when
determining the reach of their own domestic regulations. 26 Thus, it would
2' See, e.g. Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1; see also the
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 1980 ("Rome Convention"), 23
O.J. (L 266) (1980).
122 See Hague Conference on Private International Law website, http://www.hcch.net
(follow "Conventions" hyperlink; then follow "Convention of 5 July 2006 on the Law
Applicable to Certain Rights in respect of Securities held with an Intermediary" hyperlink)
(last visited on December 1, 2006).
123 Id.
124 See generally Muir-Watt, supra note 16.
125 Note, however, that scholars have advocated the need for a substantive cooperation on
an international level in the field of antitrust laws, arguing that choice-of-law strategies are not
sufficient to address problems of differing antitrust rules in the era of cross-border commerce.
See Guzman, supra note 109. Harmonizing substantive regulations may work even better than
harmonizing jurisdiction allocating rules; however, the latter may be easier to achieve and
more realistic to contemplate at this time.
126 Thus, in the antitrust area, American courts have resorted to the effects doctrine, while
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appear easier to harmonize those rules, to the extent that they are already
substantially similar.
CONCLUSION
Clashes of regulatory titans, as I refer to them, will undoubtedly
intensify in the future as the international commercial climate increasingly
moves toward globalization and cross-border markets. This article suggests
that the current solutions advocated by American scholars and employed by
American courts, mainly territorial and substance-based approaches to
resolving questions of prescriptive jurisdiction allocation, may be
insufficient in addressing this new regulatory crisis. This article suggests the
need to resort to international negotiations in order to harmonize jurisdiction
allocating rules among various countries, at least in some key domains, such
as antitrust, securities, and Internet commercial activities. While such
harmonization may be extremely difficult to achieve, I advocate the need to
start at least contemplating such a solution.
their European counter-parts have adopted a strikingly similar "implementing conduct" test.
Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) and Joined
Cases 89/ & 85, Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5233, 5246 (1988).
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